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Financial globalisation can provide significant benefits to developing countries but at the 
same time poses significant risks. There is strong evidence to suggest that developing 
economies could benefit from financial globalisation, given that certain framework conditions 
are fulfilled.
2 Hence, there is a trend towards open capital accounts, as illustrated by 
Malaysia, which recently shed controls that had been brought in 1998 in the aftermath of the 
Asian crisis. The move towards higher capital mobility confronts central banks with some 
difficult choices in implementing monetary policy: 
1.  Control of exchange rate or interest rate? If central banks want to stabilise exchange 
rates, they have to accept the consequences for domestic interest rates. If they wish 
to gain control over their domestic interest rates, then they have to accept higher 
volatility in their exchange rates. Hence, their independence to choose interest rates 
can be constrained under an open capital account. 
2.  Exchange rate or inflation as the nominal anchor? The move towards inflation 
targeting implies giving up the exchange rate as the nominal anchor for monetary 
policy, which means floating exchange rates with higher volatility. Does this mean 
that the central bank should not care about exchange rate stability as such? 
Conventional wisdom would have central banks pay attention to the exchange rate if 
it interferes with the price stability goal. But what happens when the economy is 
dollarised (Peru) or some contracts are denominated in foreign currency (Israel)? 
What should countries that are building net foreign liabilities (denominated in foreign 
currency) do when faced with the choice of exchange rate stability vis-à-vis price 
stability? This paper will address some of these issues. 
To foreshadow the main results, the paper finds that the emerging markets have become 
more financially globalised, as can be seen in a build-up of gross foreign asset and liability 
positions, increased presence of foreign investors in local currency bond markets and 
increasing correlations of stock markets in the emerging markets with those of the industrial 
countries. In fact, some countries have been able to issue longer-term local currency bonds 
in the international markets, in spite of so-called “original sin”. Such an integration is 
desirable as it increases international risk-sharing, but it can also increase the impact of 
foreign shocks on domestic economies. The recent May–June sell-off is a testimony to this. 
Although many emerging markets (mainly Asia) improved their net external positions 
between 1996 and 2004, the situation has worsened for others (mainly CEE countries due to 
deteriorating current account balances). In the light of significant external liabilities 
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(denominated in foreign currencies), CEE economies in particular are exposed to substantial 
exchange rate risk.  
On the impact of capital flows and the exchange rate regime on monetary policy, the paper 
finds that domestic short-term interest rates are significantly affected by foreign interest 
rates, especially for countries with high capital mobility and less than fully floating exchange 
rates. The link between domestic and foreign interest rates is also in line with Moreno (2008) 
that finds that the foreign long-term interest rate affects the domestic long-term interest rate 
more than the domestic policy rate. The results also indicate that the credibility gained by 
central banks in keeping inflation low and maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment 
is helping to stabilise long rates more generally. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses the constraints imposed by 
capital flows on macroeconomic policy (the so-called impossible trinity or trilemma). 
Section 2 investigates the impact of foreign interest rates on domestic interest rates under 
various exchange rate and capital mobility regimes. Section 3 analyses the indicators of 
financial globalisation and the issues related to exchange rate stability vis-à-vis price stability 
(especially in the light of balance sheet effects and dollarisation issues). Section 4 concludes. 
1.  The impossible trinity 
The transmission of monetary policy depends on the openness of the capital account and the 
exchange rate regime. The famous trilemma from the Mundell-Fleming model states that 
countries cannot simultaneously fix their exchange rate, have an open capital account and 
pursue an independent monetary policy. Only two out of these three objectives are mutually 
consistent.
3 If the capital account is closed, then domestic interest rates would transmit to 
domestic demand, irrespective of the exchange rate regime. However, if the capital account 
is open, then domestic monetary policy will be determined by the exchange rate regime and 
the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign financial assets. Under a floating 
regime, monetary policy can work either through the interest rate and liquidity channel or 
through the exchange rate channel. Under the latter channel, the impact of monetary policy 
on aggregate demand is larger if domestic and foreign assets are substitutable, as policy-
induced changes in interest rates affect the exchange rate, which in turn affects output and 
inflation. However, the higher substitutability between domestic and foreign assets offsets the 
impact of monetary policy through capital flows in a fixed exchange rate regime. Hence, 
monetary authorities can move domestic interest rates independently of foreign rates only if 
there is a lesser degree of substitutability under a fixed exchange regime.  
The foregoing analysis suggests that the exchange rate channel of monetary policy 
transmission is hampered if the exchange rate is not allowed to move freely. Indeed, nine out 
of 13 Asian and Latin American emerging economies actually use foreign exchange 
intervention to complement their conduct of monetary policy. Hence, the impact of capital 
flows on exchange rates may be offset through foreign exchange intervention. For instance, 
Malaysia intervenes in the foreign exchange market to prevent large changes in exchange 
rates that are not supported by fundamentals (Ooi (2008)).  
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2.  Do foreign interest rates influence domestic short-term interest 
rates? 
The question of monetary policy independence is closely linked to the choice of exchange 
rate regime. If it is credible, a fixed exchange rate provides a nominal anchor for monetary 
policy; if not, monetary policy is dictated by the need to attract capital flows to finance the 
current account imbalances. If policymakers float their currency, then they gain control over 
their monetary policy. The central bank can use domestic interest rates to respond to shocks 
if the exchange rate is floating. Hence, domestic short-term interest rates in countries with 
floating exchange rates should be less sensitive to changes in international interest rates. 
But certain factors (eg foreign currency liabilities) prevent countries from following 
independent monetary policies despite adopting a flexible exchange rate regime. 
The relationship between exchange rate regime and monetary policy independence has 
been tested in a few papers. For a large sample of industrial and developing countries, 
Frankel et al (2004) show that domestic short-term interest rates, even in countries with 
floating exchange rates, are linked with international interest rates in the long run. Only a 
couple of large industrial countries can choose their own interest rates over time. However, 
Frankel et al (2004) also find that the adjustment of floaters’ interest rates to international 
interest rates is rather slow, implying some monetary independence in the short run. Unlike 
Frankel et al (2004), Shambaugh (2004) finds that domestic interest rate behaviour is 
different between pegged and non-pegged regimes: countries with pegged exchange rates 
follow the base country interest rate more than others.  
There is little empirical research linking capital mobility to monetary independence. 
Shambaugh (2004) and Obstfeld et al (2005) do include a dummy variable for capital 
controls to study the link between domestic and foreign interest rates. But this measure 
cannot capture the intensity of capital controls or liberalisation. To address this, this paper 
introduces a measure of international capital mobility which gauges the intensity of capital 
liberalisation. A variable for interest rate liberalisation is also introduced. 
These academic papers are an interesting line of research, but all of them are dated. The 
data go up to 2000, but much has changed since then. During the last five to six years, the 
emerging market economies have become more open on capital account and are following 
freer exchange rate policies. For example, on a scale of 3, the average index of capital 
mobility increased from 1.61 during 1975–99 to 2.59 between 2000 and 2006 for a group of 
17 emerging economies in Asia and Latin America and including South Africa. The 
proportion of observations on exchange rate regimes classified as floating increased from 
68% to 73% between 1975–99 and 2000–06. Against this background, it would be interesting 
to see if: 
1.  higher capital mobility has increased the impact of foreign interest rates on domestic 
rates; and 
2.  floating the exchange rate helps reduce the impact of foreign interest rates on 
domestic rates. 
So what should we expect? Consider the following four scenarios and the expected domestic 
interest rate link with the foreign interest rate: 
 
  Fixed exchange rate  Flexible exchange rate 
Capital immobility   No link  No link 
Capital mobility  Positive link  ? 
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Under no capital mobility, monetary policy would be independent irrespective of the 
exchange rate regime, implying that domestic interest rates can move independently of 
foreign interest rates (and hence no link between the two). However, under full capital 
mobility, the link between the domestic interest rate and the foreign interest rate would be 
positive under a fixed exchange rate regime, as higher foreign interest rates would induce 
capital outflow and a depreciation of the domestic currency. In order to prevent depreciation, 
domestic interest rates should rise.  
However, the link between domestic and foreign interest rates is not so clear when capital is 
mobile and exchange rates are floating. The difficulty in determining the effect arises 
because central banks often intervene in foreign exchange markets, even when their 
exchange rates float, to smooth exchange rate fluctuations or accumulate foreign reserves 
(see BIS Papers no 24). If the central bank does not allow full adjustment of the exchange 
rate by intervening in the foreign exchange market even when the exchange rate is floating, 
the reaction of the domestic interest rate to a foreign interest rate shock can be large. Hence, 
we would expect a significantly positive link between domestic and foreign interest rates. 
More precisely, in order to answer these questions, I use two techniques. I estimate the 
following regression as well as the impulse response functions:
4 








If coefficient  0 1 > β  (significantly greater than zero), domestic short-term interest rates are 
correlated with foreign interest rates. The correlation may arise because of common shocks 
that require a common interest rate response, because of high capital mobility that imposes 
an interest parity condition, or because of attempts to fix the exchange rate. For countries 
with floating exchange rate regimes, any linkage may also provide evidence that the country 
does not allow the exchange rate flexibility that it claims to (fear of floating) or intentionally 
follows the foreign country. 
A1: If higher capital mobility increases the impact of foreign interest rates on domestic 
interest rates, the interaction of foreign interest rates and capital flows should be high and 
significant ( 0 3 > β ). So, I test: 
H0:  0 3 = β  against H1:  0 3 > β  
A2: If exchange rate flexibility has reduced the impact of foreign interest rates on domestic 
interest rates, then the relationship between local interest rates and foreign interest rates 
should be weaker than for countries that continue to fix their exchange rates ( 0 5 < β ). 
Therefore, I test the following hypothesis: 
H0: 0 5 = β  against H1:  0 5 < β  
In the light of the recent tightening of monetary policy in the United States, I also examine the 
asymmetry of the interest rate linkage when US monetary policy is tight.  
In addition, I estimate impulse response functions from the following regression:
6 
                                                  
4   Following Frankel et al (2004) and Shambaugh (2004), r = ln(1 + i), where i of 10% is represented as 0.10. 
Also, the regression in changes is estimated as a pooled OLS (Shambaugh (2004) Obstfeld et al (2005)), 
unlike the regression in levels with fixed effects as done in Frankel et al (2004). 
5   While other factors can influence domestic interest rates, Shambaugh (2004) controls for time, trade shares, 
debt exposure, capital controls and level of industrialisation, and finds that, during the post-Bretton Woods era, 
with the exception of capital controls, the exchange rate regime tends to be the major determinant of how 
closely domestic interest rates follow foreign interest rates.  
6   This work is in the same spirit as Romer and Romer (1989), who identify the impact of monetary shocks on 






















8, 9, 10 
The regressions show a mostly significantly positive  1 β  coefficient (Tables 1 and A1–A3), 
implying that changes in domestic interest rates in these emerging markets do move in line 
with the interest rate changes in the United States. This could be because of fear of floating 
(for flexible exchange rate regimes) or because of the interest rate parity condition (for fixed 
exchange rate regimes) or due to common shocks. The inclusion of world oil or food prices in 
these regressions does not change the sign or the significance on the change in US interest 
rates, implying that these common global shocks cannot be the reason for the positive sign. 
But this linkage with the United States is stronger for the entire sample and early part (1975–89) 
when the Fed tightens its monetary policy than when it eases it (Table 1). However, the 
relationship between domestic and US interest rates is stronger in the recent period when 
there is global tightening rather than easing
11 (Tables A1 and 2), ie interest rates in these 
emerging markets move with the US interest rates when there is a general global tightening 
which could occur due to common shocks requiring a common response. Perhaps the recent 
oil shock is one example. 
For countries with high capital mobility, the coefficient  3 β  is normally positive (when 
significant), which implies that higher capital mobility reduces these countries’ ability to 
change their interest rates independently (Tables 2, A2 and A4).
12 Countries with more 
flexible exchange rates see a downward trend in their interest rates relative to countries with 
fixed exchange rates (Tables 2, A3 and A4). But the coefficient on  5 β  is positive (when 
significant), implying that flexibility in the exchange rate has apparently not bought these 
countries any independence in setting their own domestic interest rates. Tables 2 and A4 
show that  1 β  is negative during the 2000–06 period, but  3 β  and  5 β  are positive, implying 
some delinking between the domestic and the US interest rate in general in recent times, 
except for countries with high capital mobility and a flexible exchange rate regime. This result 
is, however, counterintuitive as a flexible exchange rate regime in principle gives a central 
bank greater room to manoeuvre and so makes monetary policy more independent. But as 
discussed above, countries with flexible exchange rates can still have their domestic interest 
rates move with the foreign interest rate under a higher level of capital mobility. This point is 
brought out in Table 3. 
                                                  
7   I use four lags for domestic and US interest rates as the lags beyond that were mostly insignificant and the 
DW stat shows no sign of serial correlation. 
8   Data construction and some tables and graphs are provided in the Annex. 
9   When I exclude periods of high inflation in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, capital mobility for the entire period 
(1975–2006) becomes insignificant. All other results hold. 
10   The results remain qualitatively unchanged even when a variable is introduced to capture the business cycle. 
11   Global tightening refers to the periods when interest rates increase in the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Japan simultaneously. 
12   The results from interest rate liberalisation equations (not reported here) are similar. Countries with fully 
market-determined interest rates have their interest rates move with US interest rates during 1975–2006 and 




Impact of US monetary policy tightening
1 
 1975–2006  1975–1989  1990–99  2000–06 
Δr*   0.04    0.02   0.40    0.17 
    0.04   0.24    0.01   0.00 
US tight MP * Δr*   0.10    0.07   0.06    0.01 
    0.01   0.06    0.82   0.81 
Rsq    0.00   0.00    0.00   0.03 
DW  statistic    1.80   1.87    1.73   1.51 
Total  observations    6,902   2,360    2,671   1,871 
Cross sections    24    18    24    24 




Impact of capital mobility, exchange  
rate regime and global tightening 
 1975–2006  1975–1989  1990–99  2000–06 
Δr*   –0.01    –0.01    0.10    –0.36 
   0.82    0.61    0.81    0.08 
Capmob   0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
   0.56    0.74    0.90    0.19 
Capmob * Δr*    0.04   0.03    0.12    0.16 
   0.05    0.15    0.39    0.02 
Float    –0.0004   0.00    –0.001   0.00 
   0.03    0.36    0.01    0.30 
Float * Δr*   0.00    0.01    0.12    0.17 
   0.95    0.78    0.60    0.00 
Global Tight * Δr*   0.04    0.05    –0.38    0.24 
   0.52    0.42    0.31    0.02 
Rsq   0.00    0.00    0.01    0.07 
DW statistic    1.72    1.84    1.67    1.37 
Total observations    5,398    2,069    2,003    1,326 
Cross sections    17    16    17    17 
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Table 3 illustrates the impact of foreign interest rates on domestic interest rates classified by 
exchange rate regime and level of capital mobility.
13 When capital mobility is low, there is no 
link between domestic and US interest rates, irrespective of the exchange rate regime. But, 
as expected, the link between domestic and US interest rates is significantly positive for 
countries with a fixed exchange rate and mobile capital. In addition, countries with flexible 
exchange rate regimes have their domestic interest rate linked to the US interest rate only 
when capital is mobile. Of the 6,273 observations on exchange rates and capital mobility 
between 1975 and 2006, 40% represent a flexible exchange rate and high capital mobility 
against 21% with a fixed exchange rate and high capital mobility. During 2000–06, the 
proportion of observations with floating exchange rates and mobile capital is 72% against 
23% with a fixed regime and mobile capital. The implication is that the proportion of 
economies influenced by high capital mobility has risen sharply in recent years. Moreover, 
this has coincided with a greater reliance on floating and intervention in the foreign exchange 
markets. 
Table 3
Impact of capital mobility and exchange rate regime 
 1975–2006  1975–1989  1990–99  2000–06 
Fix*No Capmob    0.0002    0.0002    0.0005    0.0021 
   0.2954    0.3815    0.6640    0.8782 
Fix*No Capmob* Δr*  0.0002   0.0002   0.0076   0.0190 
   0.1794    0.2236    0.1529    0.3090 
Fix*Capmob     0.0001   0.0003   0.0004   –0.0001 
   0.5580    0.4248    0.1314    0.0137 
Fix*Capmob * Δr*   0.0017   0.0012    0.0028   0.0013 
   0.0220    0.1705    0.0756    0.0041 
Float*No Capmob    0.0002    –0.0001    0.0011    –0.0049 
   0.5320    0.8474    0.2391    0.5727 
Float*No Capmob* Δr*   0.0003    0.0003    0.0043    0.0897 
   0.3442    0.4696    0.4327    0.1037 
Float*Capmob   –0.0004   0.0001    –0.0008   –0.0002 
   0.0191    0.7162    0.0204    0.0002 
Float*Capmob* Δr*    0.0014    0.0012    0.0041   0.0029 
   0.0057    0.0173    0.0212    0.0000 
Rsq   0.004    0.001    0.003    0.077 
DW statistic    1.71    1.84    1.68    1.36 
Total observations    5,414    2,069    2,003    1,342 
Cross  sections  17 16 17 17 
1  P-values are below the coefficients. 
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The results from the impulse response functions support the regression results.
14 During the 
period 1975–2006, a 1% change in US interest rates leads to a 22.5 basis point change in 
domestic interest rates in the next 10 months (Graph 1).
15 Here again, we would expect the 
link between domestic and US interest rates to be higher during periods of fixed exchange 
rates and/or high capital mobility. Graph 1 shows that the interest rate pass-through from the 
US to emerging markets was about 70 basis points during 1990–99, a period characterised 
by a de facto pegged regime. But as flexibility in exchange rates has increased, the response 
rate has decreased to 30 basis points. The higher pass-through during the 1990s reflects the 
fixed exchange rate regime in most of these economies and/or higher capital mobility. 
Domestic interest rates also respond positively to global tightening (Graph A1). However, the 
response during 2000–06 is half of that during 1990–99. The link can decline either because 
of a greater willingness to let the exchange rate move or recourse to some other means than 
monetary policy (ie foreign exchange intervention) to stabilise it or because some other 
factors (exogenous to capital flows) are helping the exchange rate from falling. This may 
reflect the recent phenomenon where, despite interest rate hikes in the United States, capital 
still flowed to the emerging markets. Hence, these economies did not need to raise their 
interest rates to the same extent to prevent capital outflows and depreciations. Rather, they 
have been engaged in foreign exchange intervention to stabilise their exchange rates and 
prevent them from appreciating. Bank of Thailand (2008) notes that, despite a stable interest 
rate differential with the United States, the Thai baht has appreciated since 2004 because of 
deterioration in market sentiment over the US twin deficit and hence of the dollar. 





















Impulse response of domestic interest rate to US interest rate
 
Capital mobility diminishes the ability of these economies to conduct an independent monetary 
policy.
16 Countries with intermediate or no capital mobility have very little or an insignificant 
link between the US interest rate and the domestic interest rate (Graphs A2 and A3). For 
                                                  
14  Here again, to check for robustness, I exclude the high-inflation periods for Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and 
the results remain largely unchanged, except that the impulse responses for countries with low capital mobility 
(Graph A2, 1975–2006) and with floating exchange rates and mobile capital (Graph 7, 1990–99) become 
insignificant.  
15   The response increases to 50 basis points during 1983–2006 (since the Fed officially started targeting interest 
rates). 
16  I create dummies for no, middle and high capital mobility. No capital mobility means that the value of the 
capital mobility variable is 0; medium capital mobility is represented when capital mobility takes on the values 
1 and 2. Full capital mobility means that the variable value is 3. BIS Papers No 35  89
 
 
countries with full capital mobility, the interest rate pass-through was 70 basis points in 
1990–99, but it declined to about 30 basis points in 2000–06 (Graph 2). Similarly, the results 
from countries with fully liberalised interest rates show that the response of domestic interest 
rates to US interest rates halved between 1990–99 (87 basis points) and 2000–06 (42 basis 



















Impulse response of domestic interest rate to US interest rate for countries with full capital
mobility
 
The impulse response functions in Graphs 3 and 4 indicate that pegged regimes show a 
greater interest rate pass-through (27 basis points) than flexible regimes (20 basis points) for 
the entire sample (1975–2006). However, during the recent periods (1990–99 and 2000–06), 
flexible regimes tend to exhibit greater co-movement with US interest rates (77 basis points 
and 34  basis points respectively) than the pegged ones (60  basis points and 25  basis 
points). This may reflect a “fear of floating”. While the classification of a country as a floater in 
this paper is based on the actual behaviour of the exchange rate, central banks that float still 
intervene in response to exchange rate movements that are perceived as excessive or to 
accumulate foreign reserves (see BIS Papers no 24). If the exchange rate is not allowed to 
adjust fully, domestic interest rates can still be affected. For example, if the foreign interest 
rate falls and the exchange rate appreciates less than required to achieve equilibrium, 
domestic interest rates can still fall even under a (de facto) floating regime. Although 
domestic interest rates have responded less to US interest rates since 2000, they still exhibit 
a high co-movement, implying that central bankers in emerging markets have still not gained 
full autonomy over their monetary policies, despite adopting inflation targeting and moving to 
exchange rate regimes that can be classified as flexible but not necessarily a free float. 
The impulse responses in Graphs 5–8 shed light on what constrains monetary policy.
17,  18 
For pegged regimes, the response of domestic interest rates to US interest rates is 
significant during all periods for countries with high capital mobility (Graph 5) and only 
significant during 1990–99 for those with low capital mobility (Graph 6). The high response 
during 1990–99 may reflect the absolutely higher volume of capital flows, even for 
economies with relatively low capital mobility, that may have required significant changes in 
domestic interest rates to match the changes in US interest rates to maintain the exchange 
rate pegs. In addition, most of these emerging markets experienced currency crises during 
this period, which may have exaggerated the response. 
                                                  
17  Here I distinguish between countries with low capital mobility (values 0 and 1) and those with high capital 
mobility (values 2 and 3). 
18   There were insufficient data to estimate the impulse responses during 2000–06 for exchange rate regimes and 
immobile capital. 
Graph 2 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 






























































Impulse response of domestic interest rate to US interest rate when exchange rates are fixed
and capital is mobile
 
Graph 3 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
US interest rate when exchange rates are fixed 
Graph 5 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
US interest rate when exchange rates are fixed and capital is mobile 
Graph 4 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
US interest rate when exchange rates are floating BIS Papers No 35  91
 
 
We expect interest rates in countries with flexible exchange rates to be more independent of 
US interest rates and this is the case, especially since 1990 (Graph 8) for countries with low 
capital mobility. However, the link between the US interest rate and the domestic interest rate 
is significantly higher in countries with high capital mobility (Graph 7), implying that capital 
mobility may increase exchange rate fluctuations and induce central banks in these emerging 














Impulse response of domestic interest rate to US interest rate when exchange rates are fixed




















Impulse response of domestic interest rate to US interest rate when exchange rates are
floating and capital is mobile
 
To summarise, unlike Frankel et al (2004), Shambaugh (2005) and Obstfeld et al (2005), the 
results in this paper suggest that domestic interest rates in countries with flexible exchange 
rate regimes exhibit a higher co-movement with US interest rates than in countries with 
pegged exchange rate regimes. This conundrum is resolved from Table 3 and Graphs 5–8, 
which show the link between domestic and foreign interest rates under different exchange 
rate regimes and levels of capital mobility. The response of domestic interest rates to 
changes in US interest rates is higher for countries with flexible exchange rates and higher 
capital mobility. Although exchange rates should undertake part of the burden of adjustment 
to a foreign interest rate shock and hence we should observe a lower link between domestic 
and foreign interest rates in case of floating regimes, this mechanism may be hampered 
Graph 6 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
US interest rate when exchange rates are fixed and capital is immobile 
Graph 7 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
US interest rate when exchange rates are floating and capital is mobile 92  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
when central banks intervene. The intervention may not necessarily reduce the volatility in 
the exchange rate to less than 2%, so that the exchange rate regime would still be 
considered a de facto float according to the classification used in the paper. Indeed, the 
probability that central banks intervene in a floating regime is about 40% in the period 
2000-06 against 50% for 1975–2006. Another explanation is that the regimes classified as 
“floats” also have better developed financial markets, where the pass-through from foreign 
interest rates to domestic interest rates would be higher. These two factors could explain why 
the floating exchange rate regimes have been associated with a bigger link between 
domestic and foreign interest rates. Lastly, the estimation does not account for the possibility 
that central banks might choose to move their domestic interest rates in line with foreign 















Impulse response of domestic interest rate to US interest rate when exchange rates are
floating and capital is immobile
 
3. Financial  globalisation and its (dis)content 
Since 2000, there has been an increasing trend towards flexibility in exchange rates and the 
opening of capital accounts. For example, the proportion of observations with floating 
exchange rates and mobile capital is 72% during 2000–06 against 23% with fixed regime and 
mobile capital. These economies are also becoming financially globalised. Graph 9 shows 
foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP for various regions. This variable has 
grown at an unprecedented rate for all the regions. Ball (2006) argues that this form of 
globalisation has implications for monetary policy because it affects the behaviour of both 
interest rates and asset prices. Graph  10 shows that the five-year rolling correlations 
between regional and G7 stock markets fell after the Asian crisis of 1997–98, but began to 
rise again after the technology bubble burst in 2001. In fact, the correlations have ranged 
between 0.8 and 0.95 in recent times. 
This financial integration can be a boon or a bane, depending on the circumstances and the 
kind of external positions these countries hold. Such internationalisation of portfolios is 
desirable as it increases international risk-sharing, but at the same time shocks in one 
country can be immediately transferred to foreign holders of financial instruments issued by 
that country. Hence international events can have stronger domestic repercussions (Lane 
Graph 8 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
US interest rate when exchange rates are floating and capital is immobile and Milesi-Ferretti (2006b)). The recent May–June 2006 sell-off is a testimony to the 
vagaries of such shocks.
19 In the face of a slowdown of capital inflows, emerging markets 
can also be more vulnerable to a crisis if they have debt liabilities denominated in foreign 
currency (servicing costs rise with a depreciation) than if they rely on FDI (where returns are 











1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Asia2, 3                      
Latin America2, 4             
Central and eastern Europe2, 5








1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Hong Kong SAR
Singapore    







1 Foreign assets plus foreign liabilities, as a percentage of GDP.    2 Simple average of the economies listed or cited.    3 China, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.    4 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru and 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).
 
1  Foreign assets plus foreign liabilities, as a percentage of GDP.    
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Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
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Graph 10 
Emerging stock markets’ co-movement with the G7
1 
1 Five-year rolling correlations of equity prices between the G7 and the regions. Th
bursting of the technology bubble, respectively.
1  Five-year rolling correlations of equity prices between the G7 and the regions. The shaded areas refer to the
Asian crisis and the bursting of the technology bubble, respectively. 
Sources: Datastream; MSCI; BIS calculations. 
 
19   Basci et al (2008) show that the bond holdings of foreigners exhibited an upward trend after the 2001 Turkish 
crisis. In the recent May–June 2006 turbulence, the bond holdings of foreign investors declined sharply, while 
stock portfolios remained unaffected. As a result, both interest rates and exchange rates increased sharply in 
a very short time period. 
BIS Papers No 35  93
 
 94  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
Although not a problem for developed countries whose liabilities are denominated in 
domestic currencies, but for emerging markets that are net debtors and whose external 
liabilities are primarily denominated in foreign currency, an exchange rate depreciation raises 
the domestic currency burden of foreign liabilities. The adverse effect of depreciation on the 
valuation of the external position can outweigh the gains in trade accruing from such 
depreciation. This is one reason why emerging markets are concerned about exchange rate 
volatility (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006b)).
20 And this may perhaps explain why they 
intervene so frequently (40% of the time during 2000–06) even when the exchange rate is in 
fact floating. 
Can they borrow in their own currency? 
In order to shield themselves from the vagaries of exchange rates, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006b) argue that emerging markets should promote local currency debt markets and 
increase the role of FDI and portfolio equity inflows. In fact, some of these countries (Brazil, 
Colombia, Thailand, the Czech Republic, Mexico and Malaysia) have been successful in 
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20  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a) maintain that, with the increase in gross assets and liabilities, the valuation 
effects induced by changes in exchange rates and asset prices have become an important source of 
fluctuations in countries’ external portfolios, often swamping the effects of the underlying capital flows. 
21   The reasons for issuing global bonds vary. Tovar (2005) considers the issuance of global bonds in three Latin 
American economies (Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay) and finds that the financial crises of the 1990s and early 
2000s forced the governments to search for alternative financing to reduce their vulnerabilities. The crises also 
gave impetus to structural reforms that attracted investors. Global factors have also aided the issuance of 
bonds in domestic currency. For example, the success of emerging markets in reducing inflation in line with 
the global trend and their growing integration with developed financial markets has broadened the range of 
investors investing in emerging market securities. 
Graph 11 
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Should exchange rate stability receive any attention? Issues in a dollarised economy? 
As most emerging markets have moved towards floating exchange rates, monetary policy 
requires an anchor. Hence, there has been a shift towards inflation targeting.
22 How far such 
an approach can work in a dollarised economy is unclear; some have argued that, in such 
circumstances, the exchange rate should enter the central bank’s objective function. 
Calvo  (2006) argues in favour of aiming at exchange rate stabilisation (to the extent of 
outright pegging) during sudden stops and when there is liability dollarisation.
23 There is fairly 
good evidence suggesting that dollarised countries have more fragile corporate sectors; are 
more exposed to contractionary devaluations, devastating sudden stops and banking crises; 
and exhibit more output volatility (see Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2006) for references). Hence, the 
contractionary impact of real exchange rate depreciations limits the effectiveness of 
countercyclical monetary policy under large shocks. 
In fact, dollarisation of the Peruvian economy has made monetary policy under inflation 
targeting less effective whenever there are stronger balance sheet effects (Rossini and 
Vega  (2008)). Exchange rate volatility can also create a problem for countries where 
contracts are indexed in foreign currency. For example, rental contracts in Israel are indexed 
to the dollar (a tradition from the days of hyperinflation that still exists), hence the exchange 
rate pass-through into inflation of non-tradable goods is high and can lead to high costs in 
the event of a sharp depreciation of the shekel (Eckstein and Soffer (2008)). Morón and 
Winkelried (2003) argue that inflation targeting may be useful in guiding inflation expectations 
but, a priori, not to solve liability dollarisation issues, and hence suggest that it might be 
optimal to follow a non-linear policy rule that defends the real exchange rate in extreme 
circumstances in a financially vulnerable economy. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper presents the challenges faced by central banks in the face of highly mobile capital 
flows. The trilemma states that in such circumstances countries cannot simultaneously 
control their exchange rates and their interest rates. In order to gain monetary independence, 
countries either have to adopt a free float or impose full capital controls. Since emerging 
markets are moving towards higher capital mobility, they need to adopt a free floating 
exchange rate regime in order to gain any monetary independence. The econometric results 
from the paper indicate that although exchange rates have become more flexible in these 
economies, they are nonetheless not free floats and accordingly the interest rates of these 
economies do still respond to foreign rates to some degree. Nevertheless, the impulse 
response functions show a decreased response of domestic interest rates to changes in US 
interest rates since 2000, which might suggest that as these emerging economies gain 
credibility with their newer forms of monetary policies (a move away from fixed to flexible 
exchange rate regimes with inflation targeting), there may be further delinking between these 
                                                  
22  Under inflation targeting, central banks may be tempted to stabilise exchange rates even. For example, the 
central bank of the Philippines intervenes to dampen sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate, which tend to 
feed into domestic prices and hence affect both actual inflation and inflation expectations (Guinigundo (2008)). 
23   According to Bernanke (2005), the combination of an inflation target, central bank independence and a 
market-determined exchange rate tends to reduce variability in both inflation and output even in small open 
economies like Finland and New Zealand. However, these economies are financially robust and not dollarised 
like some emerging markets. Ball (1998) argues that, even for developed small open economies, if the 
policymakers minimise a weighted sum of output and inflation variance, then the optimal policy instrument is a 
Monetary Conditions Index based on both the interest rate and the exchange rate, while “long-run inflation” 
(an inflation variable purged of the transitory effects of exchange rate fluctuations) should be the target 
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interest rates. Indeed, several central banks have stated that inflation targeting has helped 
bring expectations of inflation down and the expectation channel is becoming stronger, 
whereby stronger anticipated effects of monetary policy require less aggressive interest rate 
changes.
24 Such credibility will help monetary policy become more independent of external 
influences. 
In addition, these economies have significantly increased their financial integration with the 
global economy. Such changes can impact the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Most central banks have given up their exchange rates and moved towards formal/informal 
inflation targeting. In such a scenario, central banks need to reassess the importance to be 
assigned to exchange rate stability vis-à-vis price stability. Exchange rates may still play an 
important role in these economies if they are dollarised or have a substantial part of their 
debt denominated in foreign currencies. In order to increase the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in such economies, de-dollarisation should be encouraged by developing local 
currency debt markets and encouraging prices to be set in local currency (as in Peru). 
                                                  
24  See Sidaoui and Ramos Francia (2008) for Mexico, where the authors show that the expectations channel 




Data construction: Monthly data on short-term interest rates are from IMF International 
Financial Statistics. They cover 24 emerging markets from 1975 to 2006.
25 The variable on 
capital mobility and interest rate liberalisation is from Omori (2005). These variables are 
coded on a scale of 0–3. For capital mobility, 0 signifies a completely closed capital account 
and 3 the most open. For interest rate liberalisation, 0 means completely controlled interest 
rates, while 3 means market-determined. Since this dataset goes up to 2002, I extrapolate 
the 2002 observation for the following years, assuming that capital account liberalisation and 
interest rate liberalisation have neither progressed nor regressed from the 2002 level. The 
dummy variable for the float was constructed in the same spirit as Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) and Shambaugh (2004). The idea is to see if the exchange rate remained within a 
±2% band in a given year. Hence, the dummy variable for the float takes the value of 1 if the 
exchange rate is outside the ±2% band over the last 12 months, otherwise it is 0. The US 
interest rate (r*) is taken to represent the foreign or world interest rate.
26 The dummy for tight 
US monetary policy takes the value of 1 when the US interest rate rises, otherwise it is 0. 
The dummy for global tightness assumes the value of 1 if interest rates in the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Japan rise at the same time, otherwise it is 0. 
 
Table A1 
Impact of global tightening
1 
 1975–2006  1975–1989  1990–99  2000–06 
Δr*   0.08   0.05   0.43   0.18 
   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Global Tight * Δr*   0.03    0.03    –0.01    0.20 
   0.53   0.54   0.96   0.01 
Rsq   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.04 
DW  statistic   1.80   1.87   1.73   1.52 
Total  observations   6,882   2,360   2,671   1,851 
Cross sections    24    18    24    24 
1  P-values are below the coefficients. 
 
 
                                                  
25   Asia: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong SAR; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = Philippines; 
SG = Singapore;  TH = Thailand;  TW = Taiwan,  China.  Latin America:  AR = Argentina;  BR = Brazil;  CL = Chile; 
CO = Colombia;  MX = Mexico;  PE = Peru;  VE = Venezuela.  Others:  CZ = Czech  Republic;  HU = Hungary; 
PL = Poland; RU = Russia; SA = Saudi Arabia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa. 
26   Since eastern European countries may not be so linked with the United States, I re-estimate the regressions 




Impact of capital mobility 
 1975–2006  1975–1989  1990–99  2000–06 
Δr*   0.00    0.00    0.22    –0.18 
   0.95   1.00    0.56   0.33 
Capmob   0.00   0.00    0.00   0.00 
   0.51   0.93    0.40   0.28 
Capmob * Δr*    0.04   0.03    0.07    0.13 
   0.05   0.14    0.62   0.04 
Rsq   0.00   0.00    0.00   0.06 
DW  statistic   1.71   1.86    1.67   1.35 
Total  observations   5,454   2,109    2,003   1,342 
Cross sections    17    16    17    17 





Table A3  
Impact of exchange rate regime 
 1975–2006  1975–1989  1990–99  2000–06 
Δr*   0.11   0.03    0.36   0.21 
   0.00    0.08    0.01    0.00 
Float    –0.0003   0.00   –0.001   –0.0002 
   0.07    0.51    0.02    0.05 
Float * Δr*   –0.05    0.02    0.11    0.04 
   0.17    0.39    0.54    0.49 
Rsq   0.00    0.00    0.01    0.04 
DW statistic    1.80    1.87    1.74    1.52 
Total observations    6,862    2,320    2,671    1,871 
Cross sections    24    18    24    24 
1  P-values are below the coefficients. 
 




Impact of capital control and exchange rate regime 
 1975–2006  1975–1989  1990–99  2000–06 
Δr*   0.00    –0.01    0.07   –0.34 
   0.91    0.71    0.87    0.09 
Capmob   0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
   0.57    0.72    0.86    0.16 
Capmob * Δr*    0.05   0.04   0.12    0.15 
   0.05    0.12    0.40    0.02 
Float    –0.0004   0.00    –0.001   0.00 
   0.03    0.34    0.01    0.22 
Float * Δr*   0.00    0.01    0.13    0.18 
   0.97    0.89    0.58    0.00 
Rsq   0.00    0.00    0.01    0.07 
DW statistic    1.72    1.84    1.67    1.38 
Total observations    5,414    2,069    2,003    1,342 
Cross sections    17    16    17    17 























Impulse response of domestic interest rate to global tightening
 







































Impulse response of domestic interest rate to US interest rate for countries with intermediate




















Impulse response of domestic interest rate to US interest rate when interest rates are
market–determined
Graph A2 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
US interest rate for countries with no capital mobility 
Graph A3 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
US interest rate for countries with intermediate level of capital mobility 
Graph A4 
Impulse response of domestic interest rate to 
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